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On one "economic point" I cannot agree with Dr. Dyer. In his right and reasonable zeal for improved efficiency of labor he repeats the commonly-accepted dogma that "without increased production or greater economy and efficiency, a general rise of wages or return to all concerned is impossible" (p. 101). The same notion underlies an argument on page 224. It is, of course, true that "all concerned" cannot be gainers unless the product is increased; but it is not true that a general rise of wages is absolutely conditioned by a rise of efficiency, so long as there exists any economic rent of land or any monopoly elements in high interest or high profits which successful organization of labor might convert into wages. It is important to recognize that these monopoly elements, forming a "surplus" which in competitive trade falls to the strongest party, prevent the complete harmonizing of the interests of capital and labor which otherwise might come from a more intelligent understanding of the common interests and a habit of working together so as to secure them. Setting aside certain small points of disagreement, I cannot speak too highly of the interpretation of industrial forces in Dr. Dyer's work. It is clear, comprehensive, and interesting; and, while the author is in strong sympathy with what may be called "progressive Socialism," he nowhere assigns an undue power to collective action, always recognizing as the true criterion of social progress the increase of individuality in the members of society.

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COMTE, MILL, AND SPENCER: *An Outline of Philosophy*. By John Watson, LL.D., Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Queen's College, Kingston, Canada. Glasgow: James MacLehose & Sons; New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895. Pp. xx., 302.

The title of this book is, I think, unfortunate, if not somewhat misleading. It certainly would not lead us to expect "an introduction to philosophy as a whole," which, according to the preface, the book is meant to be. It is also difficult to see why the name of Kant in particular should be omitted, seeing that the greater part of the book is taken up with an account and criticism of his views.

To write an introduction to philosophy as a whole, which may with advantage be placed in the hands of beginners, is certainly a

task of great difficulty. In the case of a subject which is at once so complex and so wide, it seems almost impossible, within the compass which Professor Watson has allowed himself in the present work, to combine a clear analysis and statement of separate points, such as beginners can appreciate, with the philosophic unity and compactness which are necessary to make the subject as a whole intelligible. In most text-books, the latter, though implicitly present, is from the point of view of the reader subordinated to the former. And the more complex the subject, the greater would appear to be the difficulty of giving the beginner a true view of the trees *and* the wood. Professor Watson's book, though it may not possess the charm of novelty for some readers, is eminently clear and readable; it is a book which attests on every page the ability of the author to present his subject in a lucid and attractive way. I think, however, that it would be very helpful to the reader, and especially to the beginner, if the author indicated more clearly what the connection is between different parts of his treatment. In the preface, certainly, we are told that the method followed "is to attempt to show that the ideas which lie at the basis of Mathematics, Physics, Biology, Psychology and Ethics, Religion and Art [why not Theology and *Æsthetics*?] are related to each other as developing forms or phases of one idea,—the idea of self-conscious Reason." Again, on page 20, we are told that "existence may roughly be divided into the three great related spheres of Nature, Mind, and God (whatever these may ultimately be found to mean)." We are told so, and that is all. On the whole, the book, able in most of its parts though it is, strikes us as a collection of lectures, connected certainly by an underlying unity of *view*, but written without reference to a progressive unity of treatment. The chapter on Religion, in particular, is very meagre and inadequate. Indeed, it is hardly on the subject at all. It seems to have been tacked on to give the book a kind of superficial completeness. To what the author calls the "Philosophy of Nature" 107 pages are devoted; to the "Philosophy of Mind," 44; to "Moral Philosophy," 87, and to the "Philosophy of the Absolute" (Religion and Art) only 21 pages.

There is one other more special criticism with regard to the connection of parts which I venture to make. I would suggest that the "Philosophy of Nature" as dealt with by Professor Watson is but a part of the "Philosophy of Mind." Under the title "Philosophy of Nature" he discusses the question of the possibility

of a mathematical, physical, and biological *knowledge of nature*, which he says is but the general question of the possibility of a real knowledge of nature, put in a special way. In his "Philosophy of Mind" he merely discusses the more general question of the relation of subject and object. Such a distinction is, at least without further explanation, somewhat confusing. The theory which Professor Watson upholds is that which he calls Intellectual Idealism, the theory, viz., that knowledge and morality are but deeper interpretations of nature; mind and matter, reason and desire, though opposed to a superficial observer, are really one in principle. This view he enforces not by an immediate appeal to facts, but "partly out of respect for their eminence and partly as a means of orientation" both for himself and the students under his charge, by an examination of the views of Mill, Comte, Spencer, Darwin, and Kant (the two latter are included in the preface).

The first and second chapters are general and introductory. The first deals with the "problem of philosophy," which is shown to be different from that of the Sciences. The Sciences never ask whether the principles upon which they rest are principles of reality or not, or else assume that they are. Philosophy has to take up this problem, and as such does not deal primarily with objects, but with the knowledge of them. The second chapter is devoted to a criticism of Comte's general position. This, according to the author, is necessary at this stage, because there are some thinkers who maintain "that man is by the very nature of his faculties forever incapable of knowing reality as it ultimately is; and it is, therefore, thought advisable to begin by asking whether this sceptical attitude in regard to the object of philosophy has any rational foundation, or whether it does not rather rest upon an untenable assumption." I am not sure, however, that this chapter would not fall more naturally under the "Philosophy of Mind," seeing that there we have the same problem dealt with, only more exhaustively.

In the next chapters, which treat of the "Philosophy of Nature," we have the Idealistic Theory set forth, as has already been pointed out, in greater detail. The views examined and combated in this part are mainly those of Mill (in Mathematics and Physics) and Darwin (in Biology).

In the one chapter on the "Philosophy of Mind," Spencer's view of the relation of subject and object is criticised with great acuteness and force. Some portions of the chapter, however, seem to

lack the precision and clearness which mark other parts of the work. The author (on pages 171, 172, *e.g.*) does not sufficiently distinguish between a feeling and the consciousness of it, or rather, in emphasizing their connection, tends to ignore their difference. "If the life of consciousness as it exists in man presupposes the life of sensation and impulse, it is plain that any attempt to isolate the conscious subject from the sensitive subject must result in emptying consciousness of all content. For in his sensitive life man expresses the life which pervades and gives meaning to all objective existence." "If in the sensitive life the objective world as a whole is implied, to turn away from sensation is to turn away from the objective world." All this is perfectly true; sensation is a condition of consciousness, but it is not its content, as the first sentence in the above quotation implies, or, at least, may be made to imply. The author is fully aware of the distinction, but does not at all times make it clear.

The next chapters deal with Morality. That on "Duty," though full of good matter, is, I think, the loosest in the book. The main conception is the same, viz., that Desire is not opposed to Reason, but is the condition of the self-realization of Reason. The opposition of good and evil is not an opposition of nature and spirit, of particular and universal, but of spirit and spirit, or of universal and particular made universal. The treatment is wanting in compactness, however, and contains much useless repetition.

The remainder of the book is an account and criticism of Kant's views, and, as the author says, is little more than a condensation of parts of the Master of Balliol's well-known work on Kant. The book as a whole, indeed, may and ought to be welcomed as an able and reliable introduction to the larger work of Caird on Kant. As such an introduction it will supply a much-felt want in our colleges, and will be found useful by many teachers and students.

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JOHN STUART MILL: A STUDY OF HIS PHILOSOPHY. By Charles Douglas, M.A., D.Sc., Lecturer in Moral Philosophy and Assistant to the Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood & Sons, 1895. Pp. xv., 274.

Dr. Douglas's little book is a sympathetic attempt to elucidate certain aspects of Mill's thought. As he not unjustly complains,